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Abstract: Or constructions introduce a set of alternatives into the discourse. But
alternativity does not exhaust speakers’ intended messages. Speakers use the
profiled or alternatives as a starting point for expressing a variety of readings.
Ever since (Grice, H. Paul. 1989. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press) and (Horn. 1972. On the semantic properties of the
logical operators in English. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Los Angeles
dissertation), the standard approach has assumed that or has an inclusive
lexical meaning and a predominantly exclusive use, thus focusing on two read-
ings. While another, “free choice”, reading has been added to the repertoire,
accounting for the exclusive reading remains a goal all or theorists must meet.
We here propose that both “inclusive” and “exclusive” interpretations, as cur-
rently defined, do not capture speakers’ intended readings, which we equate
with the relevance-theoretic explicature. Adopting a usage-based approach to
language, we examined all the or occurrences in the Santa Barbara Corpus of
spoken American English (1053 tokens), and found that speakers use or utter-
ances for a far richer variety of readings than has been recognized. In line with
Cognitive Linguistics, we propose that speakers’ communicated intentions are
better analyzed in terms of subjective construals, rather than the objective
conditions obtaining when the or proposition is true. We argue that in two of
these readings speakers are not necessarily committed to even one of the
alternatives being the case. In the most frequent reading, the overt disjuncts
only serve as pointers to a higher-level concept, and it is that concept that the
speaker intends to refer to.
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1 Introduction
Or constructions profile a set of alternatives, but why do speakers find it useful
to introduce alternatives into the discourse? Why do they use or constructions?
Following Grice (1989) and Horn (1972), the standard semantic analysis of a
number of natural language connectives, or among them, is as truth-functional
connectives. Linguistically, or is assumed to encode inclusivity, namely that at
least one, but possibly all disjuncts are true. As Grice and Horn recognized,
however, this analysis is at odds with how or is used in natural discourse. The
assumption is that or is only rarely used to convey an inclusive disjunction. It is
most often used to convey an exclusive reading, whereby not only at least, but
also at most one disjunct is true, although the speaker doesn’t know which one
it is.1 An enormous body of research has been devoted to accounting for this gap
between the inclusive meaning and the exclusive use of or. While the inclusive
lexical starting point has been challenged (Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Dik 1968; Harder
1996; Simons 2005a; Zimmermann 2000), the dominance of the exclusive read-
ing endpoint in actual use, has hardly been challenged in the last 40 years. We
believe it’s time we took a fresh look at the question of what it is that speakers
do with their ors.
The work presented below is part of a large-scale project on or, based mostly
on the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBC) (Du Bois et al.
2000–2005).2 We adopt a bottom-up usage-based approach to language, which
entails mapping all the readings or gives rise to in context. In fact, we believe
that this is also necessary for determining or’s linguistic meaning, but we cannot
pursue this question here.3 Our fine-grained empirical examination has revealed
that or constructions serve no less than 20 types of recurrent readings in natural
discourse. We will not, however, discuss the readings listed in Appendix A,
which include repair and idiomatic constructions (those will be dealt with in a
future publication). We note that such cases are often excluded from general
discussions of or in the literature. We restrict ourselves to 6 readings, which
1 Philosophers, however, do not see the exclusive reading as central (e.g., Jennings 1994;
Quine 1972:11).
2 Statistical claims are based on the 1053 or tokens from the SBC corpus, but we cite additional
examples, some of them from other languages, to exemplify our points in this paper.
3 In Ariel and Mauri (in prep. b) we argue against the classical analysis which assumes that or
propositions are existential claims (the inclusive core, see briefly Section 3). Instead, our
findings offer discourse support for a minimalist core meaning for or, as introducing a set of
alternatives (which are not necessarily propositional) (Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Dik 1968; Harder
1996; Simons 2005a; Zimmermann 2000).
940 Mira Ariel and Caterina Mauri
cover cases that could in theory be analyzed in terms of inclusivity, exclusivity
or free choice. We will redefine free choice readings, and we will show how the
significance of inclusive and exclusive interpretations, as discourse-relevant
readings, has been overrated, in that they have been elevated to speaker-
intended messages, when in fact, they are merely assumptions compatible with
speakers’ messages. Interestingly, similar conclusions have been independently
reached in typological studies (Mauri 2008a, 2008b), so crosslinguistic evidence
will be cited when relevant.
Briefly, why do speakers use or? Because the profiled alternativity relation
associated with or constructions serves as a starting point for a variety of read-
ings. Speakers may wish to raise alternative options for discussion even if they
cannot commit to even one of them being the case (raised options, Section 3.1).
They may mobilize the alternatives for the construction of a higher-level category
(HLC, Section 3.2). They may wish to offer a single predication over entities they
construe as separate alternatives (conjunctive, Section 4). When they cannot zero
in on a single alternative, speakers may only narrow the options to a tight set
(narrowed, Section 5.1). Speakers may wish to profile an unresolved choice
between alternatives, typically in order to elicit such a choice (choice, Section
5.2). And in some cases, the speaker’s goal is to profile some alternatives as the
only alternatives on the table, thus ruling out any others not explicitly men-
tioned (exhaustive, Section 6). Section 7 argues that although mutual (in)com-
patibility inferences (the bases for exclusive and inclusive readings), may very
well be legitimate inferences, they do not define speaker-intended or readings.
We conclude with Section 8, but we start off with theoretical and methodological
considerations (Section 2).
2 Theoretical assumptions and methodology
We briefly describe our failure to classify or constructions by reference to a
single top-down question of “exclusive or inclusive reading?” in Section 2.1. It is
this failure that prompted us to adopt a bottom-up, usage-based approach
instead. Section 2.2 motivates our choice of the Relevance-theoretic explicature
as the appropriate meaning level with which to characterize or readings.
2.1 Why a usage-based approach?
The standard literature on or takes it for granted that or is typically restricted to
one of two interpretations: inclusive and exclusive. “Or in English generally
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expresses logical disjunction. The question arises: does it express inclusive or
exclusive disjunction, or sometimes one and sometimes the other?” (Hurford
1974). And more recently, “As is well known, the interpretation of or oscillates
between an exclusive and an inclusive one” (Chierchia 2013: 11). Griceans
divided up the two readings between a lexical meaning (inclusive) and a
pragmatically implicated use (exclusive) (Horn 1989: 258), but more recent
approaches have assigned grammatical status to the exclusive reading as well.
Still, the priority of precisely these two readings (Chierchia 2004), and the
preference for exclusive over inclusive use has hardly been challenged.4
Given the expectation that or utterances are predominantly interpreted as
exclusive disjunctions, Ariel’s (2002) first attempt was to analyze the or-occur-
rences in SBC as divided between inclusive and exclusive readings, expecting to
find mostly exclusive cases. This initial study examined the or occurrences in the
29 transcripts of the SBC available then, and revealed that inclusive and exclu-
sive interpretations could not in fact be considered the only readings. Ariel could
impose an exclusive versus inclusive classification on 280 of the examples,
which indeed revealed a majority of exclusive cases. But the large gap predicted
in the literature did not actually show up. There were only 1.4 exclusive cases
per 1 inclusive case (163 versus 117). But problems ran much deeper. First, these
280 occurrences constituted less than half of the or occurrences in those tran-
scripts (591). Second, Ariel had to base her decision on world knowledge
regarding compatible and incompatible states of affairs, in effect forcing on
the data a distinction that was rather artificial in terms of speakers’ intentions.
A wish to express either an inclusive or an exclusive reading was not in fact a
speakers’ goal in using natural or constructions in discourse. While this point
will later be argued for each of the readings, a few preliminary examples might
help the reader.
Consider the following:
(1) REBECCA: when you’re talking you need to=,
..uh,
.. always say yes or no,
(SBC: 008)5
4 A free choice reading has been added to the repertoire, which we too incorporate into our
analysis (see Section 4).
5 Transcriptions of the SBC (Bois et al. 2000–2005) are only slightly simplified. Each line
represents an intonation unit. The following symbols are used: []: Overlap; (H): Inhale; = :
lengthening; @: a pulse of laughter; ..: short pause; …: long pause.
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The alternatives in (1) seem quite incompatible with each other. When instruct-
ing her court witness to respond with yes or no, Rebecca, a prosecuting attorney,
couldn’t intend her addressee to possibly use both yes and no on some occasion.
So, this seems to be an “exclusive” example. However, Rebecca’s always may
also enable an “inclusive” (or free choice) reading, whereby the addressee is
advised to use both alternatives, but in alternation, as responses to different
questions.6
So, is the exclusive reading the speaker-intended message here, or is it the
inclusive, or the free choice reading? Once we examine (1) in its natural context,
we see that it’s none of the above, in fact:
(2) REBECCA: when you’re talking you need to=,
.. uh,
.. always say yes or no,
.. as opposed to unhunh or unh-unh, ((1 LINE OMITTED))
or nodding your head,
.. okay,
because she takes everything down.
(SBC: 008)
Rebecca’s subsequent talk clarifies that it’s not the specific alternatives yes and
no that she has a communicative intention about, nor is the issue of whether the
two are or are not compatible with each other profiled (although of course, yes
and no are mutually incompatible on any single occasion, but mutually compa-
tible across different occasions). Her goal is to distinguish between verbal
responses (exemplified by both yes and no) on the one hand, and nonverbal
responses (exemplified by unhunh and unh-unh and nodding your head) on the
other hand. The reason is that the court stenographer only writes down verbal
responses. Nonverbal responses will therefore not appear on the transcript,
which worries Rebecca. Note that compliance with Rebecca’s instruction is not
restricted to using or not using just the explicitly mentioned alternatives, but
rather, applies to any realization of verbal material (e.g., I agree, I don’t know).
So, while either an exclusive or an inclusive inference is here in principle
reasonably inferable (given world knowledge), this inference has no discourse
role. We suggest it is not in fact speaker-intended (see Section 2.2 and 7 for a
Truth-Compatible Inference analysis).
6 However, that always does not rule out a ‘one but not both of X and Y’ interpretation – see ((68)).
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Next, consider a much more clearly would-be inclusive case:
(3) GILBERT: She got sick and tired of,
… you know,
turning on the news,
and seeing another … corrupt man,
or another,
.. you know.
.. another scandal breaking out.
… She knew friends that were dying in Viet- --
([6 LINES OMITTED])
she didn’t believe in the system and,
… she just didn’t care anymore.
(SBC: 012)
Objectively speaking, the alternatives in (3) are certainly compatible with each
other. The person talked about may have very well gotten sick and tired of both
another corrupt man and another scandal breaking ou’. So (3) would seem to be a
clear inclusive case, which is how (3) was initially classified by Ariel. But, once
again, we must ask, is the inclusive reading a speaker-intended message here?
We can test this by looking at what follows the or utterance.7 In (3) too it looks
like the speaker is contrasting the set of alternatives he mentions not with each
other, but rather, with something else. Here it is the friends going to war and
some of them dying. The two explicit alternatives exemplify a single unified
higher-level concept (‘annoying pieces of news about what is later referred to as
“the system”’). And this is what the speaker intends to refer to. As in (2), here too
there is no mention of the individual alternatives later in the discourse.
In an attempt to receive confirmation for her interpretation of examples such
as (3) Ariel presented mini discourses such as (4) to a group of subjects8:
(4) Which of B’s responses (B1 or B2) sounds more natural or plausible as a
response to A (circle your answer)?
7 Readers who wish to examine the SBC examples we cite in their natural context can do so at
http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/santa-barbara-corpus.
8 Questionnaire participants were 60 native speakers of English (mostly American English),
enrolled in a Hebrew language course at Tel Aviv University (2009). Preference for just one
response was overwhelming. Chi square and Chi square with Yates Correction analyses were
applied to all the or questions cited in this paper, showing highly significant results, at p < 0.01.
We thank Gila Batori for the statistical analyses.
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A: She got sick and tired of turning on the news, and seeing a corrupt
man, or a scandal breaking out.
B1: I can understand her. It’s depressing to watch the news these days.
B2: I can understand her. Both of those things are awful.
The rationale behind the B responses was that if participants interpreted 4(A) as
an inclusive or utterance, B2 should have been preferred, since it addresses the
two alternatives introduced by A. But participants opted for B1 (89.1%), finding
the annoyance with “the system” a more natural basis for a continuation than
reference to the specific alternatives.
Examples (2) and (3) exemplify some of the problems encountered by Ariel
when she attempted to impose a top-down analysis of a single research ques-
tion (inclusive versus exclusive reading) on the data. The difficulty to decide
between an exclusive, an inclusive and a free choice interpretation for (2), the
recognition, based on subsequent discourse, that neither reading actually
captured the speakers’ intentions in both (2) and (3), and subjects’ confirma-
tion of this point in (4) prompted us to adopt a bottom-up, Usage-Based
approach instead. On this approach one cannot presuppose a “one interpreta-
tive question fits all” analysis (such as, is it inclusive or is it exclusive?).
Rather, the relevant interpretative parameters may vary from case to case,
depending on the specific reading intended by the speaker. As we’ve seen
above, speakers may very well construe the same objective reality (e.g., the
relation between saying yes and no) in various, subjective ways in order to
serve their ad hoc communicative goals (see Goldberg 1995; Langacker 1987;
onwards; Verhagen 2005). This is what we were after in our classification (see
also Dancygier and Sweetser 2005; Sweetser 1990). Nonetheless, the bottom-up
analysis did not end up with hundreds of distinct readings, but, setting aside
examples such as those listed in Appendix A, the examples yielded 6 readings,
namely six distinct but recurrent ways speakers find alternativeness pertinent
to their message. We discuss the criteria we adopted for identifying a speaker-
intended reading in Section 2.2.
2.2 Defining an or reading
Language is underdetermined, which is why interpreting utterances more often
than not combines the compositional meaning with pragmatic inferences
(Carston 2002). Pragmatic inferences play a crucial role in deriving speakers’
intended messages. They may enrich linguistic meanings with conceptual
material left implicit, as in Rebecca’s when you’re talking in (2), which must
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be narrowed into ‘when you’re testifying in court’. Second, given that most
utterances are amenable to more than one compositional semantic analysis,
pragmatics is called on to determine which semantic interpretation is appro-
priate for the specific case. Pragmatics always has the last word, and or
utterances are no exception.
But what is the nature of the pragmatic inferences involved, and what is the
relevant level of meaning that defines a speaker’s (or) reading? Are implicatures
part of it? The original (neo-) Gricean analysis attributed a generalized conversa-
tional implicature (GCI) status to the scalar inferences involved, which meant
that the total reading was a Conveyed meaning (a combination of the composi-
tional meaning with the implicature). Many recent analyses no longer see scalar
implicatures as conversational implicatures per se, i.e., as external to the truth-
conditional meaning of the utterance. Relevance theoreticians see GCIs as part of
the truth-bearing explicature (Carston 1988), and according to Chierchia (2004
and onwards) they count as part of the compositional meaning. For conveni-
ence, however, the term “implicature” was kept.
This terminological convenience creates the illusion that the concept of
“interpretation” operated with here is self-evident, “‘Interpretation’ is used
here rather loosely as referring to the basic compositional meaning enriched
by whatever (possibly pragmatic) inference/implicature may be tacked
onto that” (Chierchia 2013:15). But pragmatic inferences come in a great
variety, and not all of them actually form part of the speaker-intended mes-
sage (Ariel 2016b). Moreover, even if speaker-intended, we must not count
special, ad-hoc interpretations as readings. As shown below, in order to count
as a bona fide or reading an interpretation must be (i) a speaker-intended
explicature (Sperber and Wilson 1986 [1995]), where (ii) or directly contributes
to the explicature.
Explicatures comprise of compositional meanings, enriched by speaker-
intended pragmatic inferences, which means that the explicit content of the
utterance combines encoded and inferred interpretations. But just like the
Gricean “what is said” excludes particularized conversational implicatures
(PCIs), the richer explicature representations too only include inferences that
contribute to the construction of a complete proposition. Now, it’s not always
easy to distinguish between implicatures and explicated inferences.9 But for an
explicature, the integration of the pragmatic with the linguistic must abide by
Recanati’s (1989) “Availability Principle”. This means that the two combine into
a single layer of meaning, not easily available as separable linguistic and
9 Explicated inferences are the pragmatic inferences that are integrated into the explicature.
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pragmatic components. Indeed, explicatures stand for messages directly
expressed by the speaker (hence the choice of the term explicature). It is this
constructed whole that serves as the basis on which the speaker is judged, not
only as truthful or not, but also as directly relevant or not. PCIs, special non-
literal uses and truth-compatible inferences (TCIs, see below) are not part of
explicatures, because they are independent of the proposition expressed, and,
unlike explicated inferences, carry their own truth conditions.
The prominent discourse status of the explicature (as compared with that of
PCIs) has recently received experimental support (Sternau 2014; Sternau et al.
2015): despite the fact that explicatures contain pragmatic material (hence cancel-
able, in principle), subjects overwhelmingly confirmed that it is the explicature
that the speaker meant, and that it is in fact quite impossible for her to deny
having said it. This is why we feel confident that it is this interpretation level that
best defines the relevant reading for the analysis of or utterances. An or reading is
therefore here taken to be any distinct type of explicature recurrently developed out
of an utterance containing or. We then see it as our duty to prove that ‘not both’
(“exclusive”) as well as ‘possibly both’ (“inclusive”) interpretations are not expli-
cated inferences. We do not deny that such inferences may be legitimately
derived, but we argue that for the most part, such inferences are not part of the
speaker’s intended message. Rather, they constitute either background assump-
tions (Searle 1980) or truth-compatible inferences (Ariel 2004; see Section 7.2).
Mostly, we need to remove a legitimate worry about our analysis, namely that
the readings we propose are merely “special, nonliteral” uses of or constructions,
whose explicatedmeanings are in fact either inclusive or exclusive (Gregory Carlson
p.c., Kent Bach p.c.). Should they be special uses, our findings present no challenge
to received claims about or constructions. After all, as Grice taught us, speakers use
all kinds of utterances in order to indirectly convey meanings (PCIs) that signifi-
cantly diverge from the meaning of the explicit utterance (e.g., ironies).
We will apply Ariel’s (2016b) “faithful report tests”, inspired by Kent Bach’s
(1994) IQ test (see Table 1 for a summary), in order to identify the speaker’s
intended reading (the explicature). Crucially, the various tests distinguish expli-
cated readings from inferences that we do not consider part of the reading
(conversational implicatures and others). The first test is the “That is (to say)”
test, which, due to the that is (to say) formulation, restricts the reporter’s faithful
paraphrase to the speaker’s directly communicated message.10 We provide each
10 Note that the faithful reporter on our test must be different from the speaker herself, for the
speaker may use that is (to say) more liberally, prefacing implicatures as well. Another speaker
is held to a higher degree of faithfulness.
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reading with its own fixed paraphrase, composed of linguistic expressions which
explicitly encode that reading. Once we apply the test to a given utterance using
the specific reading paraphrase we get a report which is judged either faithful or
not faithful.12 If it is faithful, the test confirms the reading under discussion. If it
is judged unfaithful the test demonstrates that the reading paraphrase does not
capture the intended reading in the specific case.
But explicated readings must not only pass the That is (to say) test. They
must at the same time fail nonexplicature tests, which will attest that they
cannot be analyzed as implicatures or as other types of inferences.13 The second
test we use here is the “Two-tier test” (see (6a)), which identifies both first-tier
explicated interpretations (i.e., readings) and second-tier indirectly conveyed
messages (strong implicatures) replacing the literal meanings. We do not con-
sider second-tier playful or ironical effects (special uses, see Table 1) readings. A
third, “Indirect addition” test identifies PCIs as additional content that falls
under the speaker’s communicative intention, but is only indirectly conveyed.
Interpretations that fail these three tests do not fall under the speaker’s commu-
nicative intention even. They may be truth-compatible inferences, namely,
potentially legitimate inferences that are nonetheless not speaker-intended, or
they may be background assumptions (Searle 1980), i.e., implicit aspects that
the speaker need not and does not assume responsibility for communicating,















+ - - + -
Speaker-intended + + - - +
Directly communicated + - - - -







11 See Ariel (2016b) for the Compatibility and the Circumstantial assumption tests, which we do
not exemplify here.
12 While the Faithful report tests here used have been put to test (Ariel 2016b) the judgments
here reported were only informally confirmed by students and colleagues.
13 Note that the application of these tests does not always produce an elegant English sentence.
Given that we avoid or, the most natural way of expressing the reading, it is only to be expected
that the paraphrase would not be as natural.
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even though she does assume them, for they form part of our world knowledge
about how things must be for the states of affairs depicted by the speaker’s
utterance. Such assumptions are not part of the reading, then.
Consider (5) in this connection:
(5) Do you want to bring the list?
Or leave it.
(17 December 2012).
The speaker in (5) pretended to ask a genuine alternative question (a choice or in our
analysis), when in fact he knew full well that the addressee wanted to bring the
shopping list along, but simply forgot to take it with her. (5) actually serves as a
humorous reminder to the addressee to bring the list. Indeed, we absolutely do not
think that ‘reminding’ should constitute a reading here (let alone of or). The speaker
intended the addressee to initially process (5) as a choice-eliciting explicature, in
order to have her arrive at the ‘reminder’ interpretation only indirectly (with an
added humorous effect). Ariel (2016b) has defined cases of irony, rhetorical ques-
tions and playful talk such as (5) as Two-Tier uses, where the first tier is provision-
ally explicated (akin to Grice’s ‘making as if to say’), while the second tier is a strong
PCI. Crucially, second-tier implicatures are quite ad hoc in that they depend on a
mismatch between the explicated content and given contextual assumptions. In
other words, they are not specifically dependent on some form (or, in our case).
An appropriate test which helped us exclude special, nonliteral use inter-
pretations is the Two-Tier IQ test (Ariel 2016b). Applied to (5), we see that a two-
tier reporting (a literal tier, replaced by an indirectly conveyed tier) constitutes a
faithful report of the reminder interpretation as a special, nonliteral secondary
meaning layer (6a). An explicated report for the reminder interpretation, using
the ‘That is (to say)’ test, on the other hand, fails here (6b), because the reminder
is not explicated:
(6) a. The speaker literally asked whether the addressee wanted to bring the
list or leave it, but actually he indirectly conveyed a reminder to the
addressee to bring the list.
b. ??The speaker asked whether the addressee wanted to bring the list or
leave it, that is (to say) he reminded the addressee to bring the list.
We intend to demonstrate that each of the readings we propose for or construc-
tions fails the Two-Tier diagnostic test (that is, it is not a second-tier nonliteral
use), but passes the explicature test, because it is directly communicated by the
speaker.
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Another set of pragmatic inferences excluded from explicatures are back-
ground assumptions, namely contextually relevant practices and assumptions
without which we cannot properly represent to ourselves the content (nor judge
the truthfulness) of the utterance (Searle 1978). For example, in order to under-
stand what the verb open means in various contexts, background assumptions
must be drawn upon. The way we open our mouths differs from the way we
open windows, restaurants, presents and computer documents. We must mobi-
lize these different backgrounds in order to derive the very literal meaning of
sentences containing open, as these are not constituents of an infinitely ambig-
uous verb open. But despite their crucial role, background assumptions remain
in the background. They are manifest to interlocutors (Carston 2002: 1–6), but
they do not constitute part of the speaker’s explicated representation. As we
shall see below, some or utterances rely on such manifest assumptions, but that
does not mean that these assumptions constitute part of their reading.
A final set of pragmatic inferences we maintain as separate from explica-
tures are what Ariel (2004, 2012; and, 2016b) defined as truth-compatible infer-
ences (TCIs). These inferences (which may even be entailments, in fact) are
assumptions which can be plausibly attributed to the speaker based on her
utterance. But crucially, these assumptions are not only not directly commu-
nicated, they are not even indirectly conveyed. Consider the following:
(7) REBECCA: . . do you guys have the cash to pay for it right now?
… When you- to get out?




Rebecca is here addressing a witness and her husband, who drove some dis-
tance to meet with her. She wants to make sure they are able pay the parking
fee. Now, it’s quite plausible to infer that ‘Rebecca thinks that her addressees are
rather poor, to the point that they may not be able to afford the parking fee’. But,
crucially, this would-be insulting assumption is not an inference that Rebecca
has a communicative intention about. In fact, this is why she chooses cash,
rather than money. So, there are conclusions which are perfectly plausible given
the speaker’s utterance, but which are nonetheless not intended to play any
discourse role.
Our point will be that background assumptions and Truth-compatible infer-
ences potentially associated with specific or examples must absolutely be dis-
tinguished from speaker-intended inferences which constitute part of the
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specific or reading. Surprisingly perhaps, we will analyze both ‘inclusive’ and
‘exclusive’ interpretations (as currently defined) as such inferences, rather than
as bona-fide or readings (see especially Section 7).14
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the pragmatic interpretations
discussed above. It is these differences that motivated our choice to only include
explicated inferences (here highlighted) as part of a relevant or reading. As can
be seen, only these inferences bear on the propositional content, are speaker-
intended, and moreover are directly communicated (in fact, they are hardly
deniable).
Based on the criteria above we will propose the following 6 readings for X or
Y constructions, as summarized in Table 2:
One final clarification is called for, regarding semantic compositionality. By
defining an or reading as the semantic/pragmatic hybrid “explicature” we do
not thereby claim that any aspect of the reading that goes beyond or’s linguistic
core is necessarily a pragmatic enrichment. Quite the contrary. Compositional
interactions of or, for example with modals, certainly contribute to developing
the relevant speaker-intended explicature (see Simons 2005a; Zimmermann
2000). Even so, pragmatics is always at work, because linguistic forms do not
invariably impose a single reading, and conversely, the very same explicature
may be developed either compositionally or noncompositionally. Consider the
second or construction in (8), for example, where Eliza offers Turner a choice
between calling her ‘Eliza’ and ‘Liza’:
Table 2: Or readings.
Reading Meaning
Raised Options Possibly X, possibly Y
Higher-Level Category Higher-level category Z (comprising members such as X and Y)
Conjunctive Both/any of X and Y
Narrowed One of X and Y
Choice Unresolved choice between X and Y
Exhaustive Only X and Y (other options ruled out)
14 Of course, all Gricean inferences are defined as having been intended by the speaker, but in
practice what we analyze below as unintended inferences were included (as conversational
implicatures) if they were required to mesh the utterance with the reality behind it.




Or Liza. (Movie: “Mr. Turner”)15
Clearly, the absence of an explicit modal (such as ‘you can call me’) is no
obstacle for deriving a free choice or reading in (8) (Free alternative for us,
see 4.2), nor does the presence of modals or other expressions always force a
free choice reading.
In fact, in addition to compositional meanings and pragmatic inferences
speakers provide addressees with linguistic cues, which create biases towards
certain readings over others. Intonation contours are such cues for the most part
(Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 1996), as is the spanning (if any) of the disjuncts
across multiple Intonation Units. But biasing cues must not be confused for
absolute codes.
Thus, we’re not disputing the need to account for the derivation of each and
every explicated or reading, but must leave this for future research. We here
chose to present an overview of the six prominent explicature types, regardless
of whether, or rather how much, of their construction depends on compositional
versus on pragmatic components. This reflects our interest in exploring the types
of messages speakers express based on a linguistic core of profiled alternatives.
Indeed, while the SBC or constructions manifest many more than the handful
readings usually discussed, it is noteworthy that its 1053 tokens can be
accounted for by reference to mere 20 readings.
The classical analysis of or constructions assumes a speaker’s commitment to
at least one of the alternatives being the case. We find that speakers may commit
to only one alternative (Section 4), to all alternatives (Section 5), and even to none
of them (Section 3). For ease of comparison with the classical approach we
organized our proposed readings according to the commitment criterion.
3 Not committing to even a single disjunct
Section 3 introduces two readings where the speaker is not necessarily committed to
even one of the disjuncts.We start with raised options (3.1), followed by higher-level
category (3.2). Note that we see no reason to exclude nondeclarative or construc-
tions. But if so, what does commitment mean in nondeclarative sentences?
15 We thank Israela Becker for providing us with this example.
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Especially relevant to our analysis is the fact that on the one hand, or questions do
not necessarily lack speaker commitment to one or more of the alternatives, and
that on the other hand, assertions do not necessarily so commit the speaker. Green’s
(2014) definition of commitment, also applicable to illocutionary forces other than
assertions, supports this point. Applying his definition to or constructions, we take a
speaker uttering X or Y to be committing to ‘at least one of X or Y’ if she is liable to
error should neither one of X and Y be the case. A speaker uttering X or Y does not,
however, commit to even a single alternative if she is not liable to error should
neither X nor Y be the case. Green suggests that speakers’ (non)commitment can be
brought out by embedding the or construction (in our case) in a challenge scenario,
where the interlocutor challenges with, “how do you know that?”, followed by an
assertion that in fact none of the alternatives hold (see (10i) below). A speaker
committing to ‘at least one of X and Y’ is obliged to retract her ‘X or Y’ if she's
unable to respond to that challenge adequately. A speaker who does not commit to
‘at least one of X and Y’ does not need to. Indeed, in the two readings discussed
in this section the speaker doesn’t need to retract her utterance should neither X
nor Y hold.
An additional, more compact way to identify the speaker’s commitment in or
constructions, nonassertions included, involves the insertion of dubitative expres-
sions such as maybe, scoping over what the speaker is (not) committing to
(see (10ii)). Adding maybe to noncommitting readings may have consequences
for the reading itself, but not for what the speaker commits to (the speaker
remains uncommitted). But in committing readings, we expect the addition of
maybe to have consequences not only for the reading, but also for the speaker’s
commitment, which turns into noncommitment to ‘at least one of X and Y’.
Here’s an application of the (non)commitment tests to a nonassertion (9) and to
an assertion (10)16:
(9) PATTY: Was that World War Two,
or World War One.
(SBC: 023)
i. ~B: How do you know that it was one of the two? It was actually
the Hundred Years’ War.
PATTY2: Oh, really? Then I’m wrong and I take my question back.
ii. ~Was that maybe World War Two? or maybe World War one?
Note that Patty is liable to error here (i), which is why she has to retract her
question once not even one of the alternatives she introduced turned out to be
16 ~ denotes an unattested utterance.
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true. Indeed, despite the interrogative illocutionary force, Patty did commit to
the true answer being one of the two wars. (ii) shows that this commitment is
removed once we add maybes scoping over each of the alternatives. Patty’s
original question, then, counts as committing to ‘one of the alternatives’.
Now, contrast (9) with (10), which we analyze as a noncommitting (raised
options) or reading. Using an assertion, Brad is illustrating the features of a tape
recorder he’s trying to sell. He mentions that with this recorder one can listen to
the radio at the same time that one is recording:
(10) BRAD: … one can listen to … (TSK) (H) the tuner, ([1 LINE OMITTED])
… so you could put on KDB, ([4 LINES OMITTED])
Or there’s one ~Matt likes,
(SBC: 016)
i. ~B: How do you know that? You can’t put on either one in our area.
BRAD2: Those were just examples! My point was that you can listen
to the radio.
ii. ~ So you could put on maybe KDB (or) there’s maybe the one
Matt likes.
Note that Brad is not here liable to error, and does not have to retract his assertion
once both alternatives turn out to be wrong. Because indeed, what he asserts,
namely that one can simultaneously record and listen to the radio, is independent
of the specific radio stations hementions, for which he undertakes no commitment.
(ii) shows that adding maybe, or even substituting or with maybe, does not affect
the speaker’s noncommitment to “at least one of the alternatives.” This is quite
different from the pattern observed in (9), where commitment was lost oncemaybe
was added. The or construction used by Brad counts as noncommitting, then.
3.1 Raised options or: ‘possibly X, possibly Y’
The standard linguistic meaning assumed for disjunctions is inclusive, which
means that the speaker must be committed to at least one of the alternatives
being true. But as we’ve seen in (10), speakers sometimes raise a few alterna-
tives, while guaranteeing none. Consider (11) in addition:
(11) S: At a certain stage part of the shares were transferred to the children
before going out on the stock exchange or they were returned and divided
up or partly returned I don’t remember… you have our prospectus here.
(Originally Hebrew, Lotan 1990).
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Note that S’s I don’t remember in (11) does not mean ‘I don’t remember which of
the three alternatives I mentioned is the correct one’. Rather, he means he
doesn’t remember what happened exactly. The (non-exhaustive) options he
raises are certainly possible, but it’s also possible that none of the alternatives
is true. This is why the speaker suggests that the addressees consult the pro-
spectus, which presumably presents the facts.
The reading (explicature) associated with a raised options X or Y construction
is ‘possibly X, possibly Y’, which is therefore the linguistic formula we use in the
‘That is (to say)’ test (see 14 below). Such uses are not very frequent in the corpus
(57 = 5.4%, 91= 8.6% if we add “Biased raised options” and “Repair into raised
options” cases, not here discussed), but they nevertheless constitute a distinct set
of occurrences. Raised-Options ors are used by speakers to articulate options they
are entertaining, often while searching for the right one.17 Note (12):
(12) JILL: …(TSK) Hey cutie pie,
are you there?
…(H) Or are you sleeping.
(John Du Bois p.c.: Cutiepie)18
In her voicemail message in (12) Jill does not expect the addressee to necessarily
confirm as true at least one (or both) of the alternatives she explicitly asks about
(‘are you there, but not picking up the phone’; ‘are you sleeping’). She is well
aware that there may be another reason for why the addressee did not pick up
his phone. The thrust of raised options or constructions is then to raise options,
where the speaker’s communicative intention guarantees neither exhaustivity
nor commitment to any one of the alternatives explicitly expressed. Not surpris-
ingly, a disproportionate number of raised options constructions come in multi-
tudes, and form part of three or more disjunct constructions (19.8% vs. 4.9% on
average for the other or constructions).
The most obvious feature of or constructions used to raise options is lack
of exhaustivity. This is why in a majority of these cases the construction does
not end with a falling intonation contour (marked by a period in SBC), but
rather with a nonfinal intonation (a comma in SBC) or an appeal intonation
(a question mark in SBC) (see 10). Indeed, Zimmermann (2000) and Geurts
(2005) proposed that exhaustivity is not a necessary part of natural language
17 Jennings (1994) attributes this function to what he terms “proto-disjunctive or” uses, how-
ever, his examples (p. 295) are what we would classify as “repaired into raised options.”
18 This recording is from a voicemail message that precedes the conversation known as
Cutiepie (SBC: 028).
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or-constructions and must be indicated by final intonation. But while final
intonation is indeed an excellent cue for exhaustivity, it’s not an absolute
convention (see 12). We should emphasize, however, that raised options are
noncommittal in a deeper sense, in fact. It’s not only the case that the explicit
alternatives do not exhaust all possibilities. It may very well be that the
speaker commits to none of the alternatives she mentions even though she
doesn’t envision other alternatives.19
Now, assuming we’re right about the characterization of these raised options or
constructions, then they are quite parallel to a series of dubitative constructions,
such as perhaps X, perhaps Y. Here’s a case where the speaker alternates between or
and maybe, using the two quite interchangeably. In fact, in line with the maybe
diagnostic above, s/he could have used a series of maybes instead of an or20:
(13) a. He’s like twenty five or twenty six, maybe twenty seven but married to
this lady who could be his mother.
(LSAC)21
b. ~… He’s maybe twenty five maybe twenty six, maybe twenty seven…
Interestingly, recent typological data point in the same direction. Mauri (2008a,
2008b; cf. also Mauri and van der Auwera 2012) has argued that languages lacking a
connective equivalent to or typically express situations like the ones in (11) through
the juxtaposition of clauses marked as ‘potential’, e.g., by dubitative adverbs (‘per-
haps X, perhaps Y’). As pointed out by Giacalone Ramat andMauri (2011), dubitative
markers are also among the most frequent diachronic sources for disjunction.
Applying our diagnostic tests to (11), we can see that raised options should
indeed count as an explicated or reading:
(14) a. S said that... the shares were transferred to the children before going
out on the stock
exchange or they were returned and divided up or partly returned, that
is (to say),
possibly they were transferred to the children before going out on the
stock exchange,
possibly they were returned and divided up, possibly partly returned.
19 Of course, in principle, something is always the case. But our point is that Raised options do
not commit the speaker to any of the explicit options, just like Possibly X, possibly Y doesn’t.
20 Of course, or constructions have to meet further conditions that maybe utterances do not.
21 LSAC is the Longman Corpus of Spoken American English, which we used while Mira Ariel
was on sabbatical at UC Santa Barbara.
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b. ?? S literally said that... the shares were transferred to the children
before going out
on the stock exchange or they were returned and divided up or partly
returned, but not all of the above, but actually he indirectly conveyed
that possibly they were transferred to the children before going out on
the stock exchange, possibly they were returned and divided up, possibly
partly returned.22
(14a) shows that the raised options reading we propose passes the ‘That is (to
say)’ explicature test, and (b) complements (a) in showing that it fails the
second-tier test, which means it’s not an implicature.
To sum up, we include under raised options or constructions cases where:
(15) a. The speaker’s goal is to make hypotheses about the right alternative(s).
b. The speaker puts on the table multiple alternatives she entertains.
c. The speaker undertakes no commitment to the set of the alternatives
she raises.
d. The explicit alternatives do not necessarily exhaust the set of
possibilities.
3.2 Higher-level category (HLC) or ‘higher-level category Z,
such as x and Y’
Many of our cognitive categories are stable, others are ad hoc (Barsalou 1983
and onwards). Stable categories can typically be expressed by fairly short
conventional linguistic means (e.g., ‘queen’, ‘eagle’, etc.). Ad hoc categories,
however, do not come with ready-made linguistic expressions (e.g., ‘places
with a low rate of HIV positive males’ – see (17) below). Since categories
cannot be defined by reference to a set of common features (Wittgenstein
1978), a useful speaker strategy is to provide the addressee with exemplars
of the category she has in mind. The addressee can then construct the category
based on the exemplars provided to him. Moreover, Barsalou (1991) finds that
subjects show a high degree of agreement regarding typical exemplars, even
for rather unusual ad hoc categories, which means that exemplars (embedded
22 We took the exclusive, rather than the inclusive interpretation here to be the plausible
candidate for an explicature on the classical view.
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in supporting contexts) may serve as useful pointers for conjuring up higher-
level categories. We propose below that or constructions are often used for this
purpose precisely, speakers introducing exemplars as disjuncts, with the
intention of referring to the higher-level category that the exemplars are
members of. As we see below (in Example (16)), this strategy is not necessarily
limited to the expression of ad hoc or innovative categories where natural
language is wanting.
3.2.1 Disjuncts as pointers to a higher-level category
Higher-level category or constructions (HLCs) introduce alternatives which
should be taken by the addressee mainly as pointers to a higher-level category.
Each disjunct must be construed as a member of a higher-level category which
has as co-members the other alternative(s) the speaker mentioned (and possibly
others). The disjuncts then serve as a means for achieving another end, con-
structing the higher-level category intended by the speaker. For example, when
Diane asks her question in (16) she does not care about the male/female
distinction, despite the fact that she uses it:
(16) NORA: Wonder who was the ruler.
LINDA: (H)
NORA: in nineteen ten.
DIANE: Who was the king or queen?
NORA: Mhm.
LORI: I don’t know.
(SBC: 023)
Rather, her intention is to refer to a single entity, ‘the nonpolitical ruler, the
monarch’. Her interlocutors should construct this higher-level category by
considering both the exemplars supplied by the speaker and the discourse
context.
The reading (explicature) associated with an HLC X or Y construction is ‘Z
[ = higher-level category] such as X and Y’, which is therefore the linguistic
formula we use in testing for the reading in the ‘That is (to say)’ test (see (27b)
below).
Just like raised options, HLC uses do not necessarily commit the speaker to
at least one of the options being the case, and a series of maybes can be added
to the utterance (17b). Consider:
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(17) a. HAROLD: And then like,




central Iowa and stuff,
.. had like … ten percent or less,
… of the males,
.. had been infected.
(SBC: 002)
b. ~And then like, maybe rural areas (or) maybe central Iowa and stuff
had like ten
percent or less of the males had been infected.
Harold had been talking about the alarmingly high rate of HIV positive males
in the Bay area in California. He then contrasts this rate with that of “rural
areas, or, central Iowa and stuff”. What he has in mind is most likely some-
thing like ‘places remote from the major urban population centers’, which
include rural areas, but also small cities. Now, ‘places remote from the major
urban population centers’ is not only a mouthful. It’s hard to come up with
this abstract definition. So, while the speaker’s intention is definitely the
higher-level category here (Harold is not trying to zero in on the precise
member of the category), he gets to it by providing the addressee with con-
crete members of the category, namely, rural areas in general and places,
including cities, in Central Iowa, presumably assumed to not have major
urban population centers.
Here’s a very clear case where the speaker is finding it hard to formulate her
abstract concept, which motivates her use of an HLC. This is why once her
addressee offers the missing higher-level category (position) she immediately
adopts it:
(18) SUE: (H) .. they strongly felt that you had to have a certain amount of
money,
or,
...or a certain future in order to –
… [end up] –
LORI: [position].
SUE: Yeah.
Position in order to have a wife.
(SBC: 023)
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In the following example most likely the speaker has a vague concept of
‘canonical poet’, but not being highly educated, she uses an HLC instead of
the term she seems unaware of:
(19) Is Naomi Shemer ((a very popular Israeli song writer)) considered a poet like
Bialik or Alterman or Rachel ((three very prominent, canonical Israeli
poets))?
(Originally Hebrew, tips.co.il/singleask.asp?stipid, 24 October 2012).
Note, however, that while seemingly roundabout in getting their job done, HLC
formulations may at least at times have an advantage over the abstractions they
stand for. First, to appreciate the relevant issue consider the following or-less
example:
(20) CAM: she said something like, ([2 LINES OMITTED])
he was sort of weird,
I didn’t like you hanging around him.
… And I said what do you mean he was weird.
.. And she said he was sort of effeminate.
(SBC: 044)
As Barsalou (1991) notes, categories are invariably contextualized in everyday use.
How can we express a context-specific category when linguistic expressions are
typically tailored to the normative concepts? Relevance theoreticians (Wilson and
Carston 2007) have emphasized the need to narrow linguistic concepts in order to
get to the speaker’s context-specific intended concept, more often than not some
ad hoc concept somehow associated with the linguistic term. For example, it’s not
that Cam is not familiar with the meaning of weird. The reason he asked his
mother about what she meant is that weird can be contextually adapted differently
in different contexts. Indeed, once Cam pins his mother down he learns that the
concept of weirdness she had in mind was that the guy was effeminate (gay, in
fact), and not, for example, that the guy was socially awkward.
Using an HLC, we propose, has a double function, at least sometimes. On the
one hand it points to the higher-level category intended by the speaker, but at the
same time, it helps the addressee narrow this highly abstract concept and tailor it to
the specific context. For example, position is a rather general concept. Sue’s HLC in
(18) helps us not just arrive at the higher-level category, it also narrows it to
something like ‘social prominence, crucially accompanied by substantial money’.
Now, contrast this with the following reference to a higher-level category of position:
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(21) MONTOYO: …s If I am,
… for example,
… the president (H) .. of .. a major labor union,
.. or a major corporation.
… the position,
.. (H) as president of that entity,
… gives me so much power.
(SBC: 012)
In the context of (21), Montoyo’s position is differently adjusted. Here ‘power
and authority over people’ is the salient content of the adjusted concept,
money and social prestige not necessarily highlighted. In other words, HLCs
may not only solve a speaker or a hearer’s difficulty in articulating or
interpreting some abstract category, they may actually help in the ever-
necessary process of adjusting the linguistically expressed concept to the
specific context. The specific exemplars chosen by the speaker have a dis-
course standing, then, which is why we include them in the explicated
representation.
Context too plays a major role in determining what the higher-level category
intended by the HLC speaker is. Consider the following identical disjunctions
(a table or a bench), all originally Hebrew HLCs:
(22) a. A table or a bench placed in the yard are also more vulnerable to
insects and pests
(www.yossisadan.com/home/artdetails.aspx?mCatID = 60&artID)
b. When an antique painting or a fragile sculpture is concerned the prohibi-
tion ((against touching them)) is understandable, but when the display is
a chair, table or bench onefeels much more frustration.(www.haaretz.
co.il/gallery/design/1)
c. One mustn’t place the appliance on the edge of a table or a bench
(www.newpan.co.il/sites/newpan.lxst…/2534BDM1200Ssmall)
The stable superordinate category that researchers normally envision upon
hearing a table or a bench is most probably ‘furniture’. But this is not what
any of the HLCs in (22) denote. (22a) points to wooden things, nonfurniture
included, (22b) to ‘objects in an exhibition one could not possibly damage’
(nonwooden objects included), and (22c) to ‘surfaces with unprotected
edges’ (so a table or bench, protected by walls, for example, is not
included).
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Speakers find HLCs extremely useful as far as or constructions are con-
cerned. HLC is the most frequent reading conveyed by the or constructions in
SBC: 254/1053 (24.1%). And like raised options or constructions, HLC speakers
are not committed to even one of the disjuncts they explicitly specify, although
they are definitely committed to the higher-level category being the case.
3.2.2 Single-alternative tests
In order to verify that HLCs denote a single alternative, we first look at responses
to HLCs. We expect responses to HLC questions to accommodate yes, to pre-
ferably not discuss the specific disjuncts, but rather, the higher-level category,
and to even be coherent when the addressee agrees with the speaker’s HLC yet
proceeds to confirm a member of the higher-level category not mentioned in the
original HLC construction. A subsequent singular anaphoric reference also
attests that speakers are treating HLCs as denoting single entities.
Consider the different responses (marked bold), overwhelmingly preferred
by the questionnaire participants to the following two, seemingly similar ques-
tions (see again Note 9):
(23) A: Would you like apple pie or cheese cake?
B1: Apple pie, please.
B2: Yes, please.
(24) A: Would you like the two of us to go away for three or four days?
B1: Four. That’s a good idea.
B2: Yes. That’s a good idea.
The (23) or construction is an alternative question, a choice or in our terminology
(see 5.2). B1 then appropriately makes a choice. But the (24) or construction is
taken as an HLC, which is why it receives a yes response. And here’s a garden-
pathing example, where we initially tend to assume that an alternative question
is alluded to, but it turns out to be an HLC question about Obama’s race
affecting his chances to get elected:
(25) Asked whether Obama’s race will hurt him or help him, 22 percent said “yes”
in response to a Pew question. Black respondents were more likely than
whites to say his race would hurt; whites more likely to say it would help.
Half of everyone polled said it would make no difference.”
(http://www.mcclatchydc.com/226/story/53486.html)
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The next example shows that the addressee can confirm the speaker’s HLC, yet
go on to assert a different alternative, provided the alternative is a member of
the relevant higher-level category intended by the speaker:
(26) ROY: saving the whale,
or saving uh … the .. polar bea[r,
PETE: [Right… Pandas],
ROY: or making sure there’s enough] grizzly bears,
that’s fine.
(SBC: 003)
Note that Pete agrees with Roy (saying right), but he can still assert a different
alternative, just because he takes Roy’s or construction to be an HLC referring to
‘saving endangered animals’. Preliminary experimental results confirm this dis-
course pattern (Ariel et al. in prep.). In addition, note Roy’s treatment of the saving
of all these animals as a single concept, using that, rather than those or all those.
The same is true for the singular anaphoric reference that entity in (21), where two
entities were mentioned, ‘a major labor union’ and ‘a major corporation’. That
entity refers to a ‘position of power’, constructed from the two exemplars explicitly
mentioned. Examples (24) and (26) point to the same phenomenon: an HLC counts
as a single, rather than as a multiple-alternative or construction.23
To see that indeed, the HLC interpretation is an explicated reading of these
or constructions, consider (27) as faithful reports of (21):
(27) a. ?? Montoyo literally said that if he is the president of a major labor
union or a major corporation, or possibly of both, the position as pre-
sident of that entity…, but actually he indirectly conveyed that if he is
the president of a powerful organization such as a major labor union and
a major corporation, the position as president of that entity …
b. Montoyo said that if he is the president of a major labor union or a major
corporation, that is (to say) if he is the president of a powerful organi-
zation such as a major labor union and a major corporation, the position
as president of that entity…
(27a) shows that the higher-level category (president of a powerful organization)
is not a second-tier indirectly conveyed implicature, and (b) shows that it
behaves as the explicated meaning.
23 Additional tests and arguments for the reality of the single-alternative Higher-level category
are presented in Ariel (2016a).
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Summing up, we include under HLC or constructions cases where:
(28) a. The speaker introduces multiple alternatives as exemplars of a single,
higher- level category.
b. The speaker most prominently puts on the table one alternative, namely
the higher- level category.
c. The speaker undertakes no commitment to the set of the alternatives
she raises, although she does commit to the higher-level category.
d. The explicit alternatives do not necessarily exhaust the set of
possibilities.
e. The specific exemplars are crucial not only for pointing to the higher-
level category, but also for contextually adjusting it.
4 Would-be inclusive constructions:
conjunctive or
Searching for inclusive or constructions, we collected cases where (i) the speaker
intended to actually convey multiple alternatives (thus ruling out HLCs) (ii) the
speaker was taken to commit to at least one of the alternatives (thus ruling out
raised options) (iii) the speaker could not have intended to convey a mutually
exclusive ‘not both’ interpretation. We found 80 such cases in SBC (7.6%).
On our analysis, an inclusive reading is expected to explicate that ‘possibly
X, possibly Y (and) possibly X and Y’. Indeed, when we apply the That is (to say)
test using this formula to (29a)), an unequivocally inclusive or construction (one
containing and/or), the result is a faithful report (29b):
(29) a. All the sections are kind of self-sufficient, having kitchen units and/or
bathrooms (LSAC).
b. The speaker said that all the sections are kind of self-sufficient, having
kitchen units and/or bathrooms, that is (to say) possibly kitchen units,
possibly bathrooms and possibly both kitchen units and bathrooms.
Or constructions giving rise to inclusive explicatures should then be faithfully so
reportable. This is not what we found, however. We propose that bare or
(as opposed to and/or) does not give rise to an inclusive explicature.24
24 We should remind the reader, however, that this claim does not mean that inferences re the
compatibility of ‘both X and Y’ with X or Y are illegitimate or nonexistent. What we are claiming is
that ‘inclusivity’ is not a speaker-intended explicaturewhen a bare (either) or is used (see Section 7).
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Consider some examples:
(30) a. JIM: But for mathematics or for science, ([1 LINE OMITTED])
it’s an opportunity for them ([3 LINES OMITTED])
to get closer to,
(H) to the chaos,
(SBC: 017)
b. FRANK: it’s,
..easier to do naked eye. ([4 LINES OMITTED])
Or or binoculars. (SBC: 019)
c. DARLENE: I didn’t even wear it to Jennifer or Ann’s wedding.
(SBC: 052).
d. ALICE: You know if you … put a situation like that to ~Tim or
~Mandy,
([4 LINES OMITTED])
… They … hem and haw around,
(SBC: 007).
As expected, we found a significant correlation between “inclusivity” and
Downward Entailing (DE) contexts (as in (30c) and (30d). But not all “inclusive”
readings occurred in such contexts (e.g., (30a) and (30b)), and not all or-construc-
tions occurring in a DE context received an inclusive interpretation (e.g., (21)).
More interestingly, however, while compatible with ‘possibly both’, the examples
in (30) actually express a stronger reading than ‘inclusivity’. Indeed, two diag-
nostic tests show them to differ from truly inclusive cases.
First, note that the examples fail the That is (to say) test for inclusivity that
(29a) does pass:
(31) a. ?? The speaker said that it’s easier to do naked eye or binoculars, that is
(to say) it’s easier
to do possibly naked eye, possibly binoculars and possibly both naked
eye and binoculars.
b. ?? Alice said that if you put a situation like that to Tim or Mandy, that is
(to say) possibly to Tim, possibly to Mandy, (and) possibly to both Tim
and Mandy, they hem and haw around.
The paraphrases in (31) are not faithful, because they are too weak (a), both too
weak and too strong (b, see below). This is why we classified the examples in (30)
as conjunctive instead. For an or construction to count as conjunctive it must show
a speaker’s commitment to both/all alternatives in some sense. This is the source
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of the second difference between ‘inclusive’ and the examples under discussion.
Conjunctives (but not true ‘inclusives’) can form a coherent first-part of an
exchange where the second-part introduces an interlocutor’s denial of any one of
the alternatives, which then justifies his declaring the first utterance false. The
rationale is that since the speaker uttering a conjunctive or construction commits to
both alternatives, another interlocutor can legitimately declare her utterance false
by denying one of the alternatives. Consider first nonconjunctive or constructions
(Raised options in (32a), Inclusive in (32b)), in order to see that these cannot be so
declared false:
(32) a. S: At a certain stage part of the shares were transferred to the children
before going out on the stock exchange or they were returned and
divided up…
B: ~?? That’s not true. The shares were never transferred to the children
before going out on the stock exchange.
b. A: All the sections are kind of self-sufficient, having kitchen units and/or
bathrooms.
B: ~ ?? That’s not true. My section doesn’t have a kitchen.
Since S (in a) did not commit to the truth of ‘the shares were transferred… before
going out…’ B cannot declare his utterance false even if this alternative is false.
And since A (in b) did not commit to every section having a kitchen, it too
cannot be declared false. But unlike (32), the exchanges in (33) are coherent:
(33) a. A: It’s easier to do naked eye or binoculars.
B: ~That’s not true. It’s not easier to do naked eye.
b. A: if you put a situation like that to Tim or Mandy they hem and haw
around.
B: ~That’s not true. Mandy won’t do that.
Since the or constructions here are conjunctive, the falsity of one of the
alternatives is sufficient to render the utterance false. Once again, truly inclu-
sive cases (33b) pattern differently from conjunctive cases. Conditional ante-
cedents (33b), considered prime inclusive cases, are no exception. Indeed, our
data support Dik’s (1968) claim that only and/or constructions are truly
‘inclusive’.
Conjunctive or constructions are puzzling. They seem to neutralize the
difference between and and or. In Ariel and Mauri (in prep. a) we propose that
they actually do not, because only in or constructions each of the disjuncts must
introduce an alternative considered on its own. At the same time, conjunctive
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cases are not all of one stripe. The nature of the speaker’s commitment, as well
as her stance towards the alternatives, differ for different conjunctive cases. We
distinguish between two conjunctive cases: separative conjunctions (4.1) and
Free alternatives (4.2).25
4.1 Separative conjunction: ‘Both X and Y’
Jennings (1994) observes that the use of or in what seem to be conjunctive uses
is motivated by an intention to emphasize the “distinctness rather than the
cumulativeness of the possibilities mooted”. In fact, “the role of ‘or’ is that of
a separative conjunction” (Jennings 1994: 299). We then define a separative
conjunction reading as one where the speaker necessarily commits to both
alternatives, in addition foregrounding the independence of each from the
other. In most cases separate states of affairs are involved. The linguistic
formula we use in the ‘That is (to say)’ test for identifying this reading is both
X and Y (34a). Example (34b) shows that the separative conjunction reading is
not implicated as a second-tier “special” use26:
(34) a. Jim said that for mathematics or for science, that is (to say) for both of
mathematics and science it’s an opportunity to get closer to the chaos.
b. ?? Jim literally said that for mathematics or for science or possibly for
both of them it’s an opportunity for them…, but actually he indirectly
conveyed that for both mathematics and science…
separative conjunction or constructions are bona fide conjunctions, so the or can
be replaced by and (35a), and each alternative is entailed (35b):
(35) a. For mathematics and for science, it’s an opportunity for them to get
closer to the chaos.
b. For mathematics it’s an opportunity to get closer to the chaos.
The difference between the and version in (35a) and the original or version in
(30a) is that the latter also profiles an alternativity relation (Ariel and Mauri in
prep. a).
25 We here take a different position from Klinedinst (2007), who does not make this distinction.
26 See Simons (2005a) for a similar defense of a nonimplicated status for the ‘both’
interpretation.
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Summing up, using a separative conjunction or construction:
(36) a. The speaker puts on the table multiple alternatives.
b. The speaker commits to all the alternatives being the case.
c. The independence of each of the alternatives is highlighted.
4.2 Free alternative: ‘Any one of X and Y’
Following Kamp (1973), free choice disjunctions have attracted quite a bit of
attention (e.g., Chierchia 2013; Geurts 2005; Simons 2005b; Zimmermann 2000).
Just like separative conjunction cases, the classical free choice or constructions
(as in (37)), are conjunctive in that they allow falsification on the basis of one
false alternative (38a), they manifest and substitution (38b), and a legitimate
inference to only one of the alternatives (38c).27 Consider:
(37) RANDY: … But you can wrap em around,
to one-thirty or one-sixty,
(SBC: 022)
(38) a. ~That’s not true. I can’t wrap ’em around to one-thirty.
b. You can wrap ’em around to one-thirty and you can wrap ’em around to
one-sixty.
c. You can wrap ’em around to one-thirty.
But we distinguish such cases from separative conjunctions, because they carry
an additional free choice, “no matter” flavor, where the speaker projects herself
as open to any of the alternatives. This is true for the modal-containing (38), as it
is for the modal-less (8), where Eliza allows Mr Turner a free choice between
calling her Eliza or Liza.
While many Free Alternative cases pattern as above, constructions contain-
ing strong modals, such as be required in (39a), do not pass the ‘and’ substitu-
tion and the single-disjunct entailment tests. But their conjunctive nature is
evident from the fact that an interlocutor can coherently deny their truth
based on a denial of any one of the disjuncts (39b):
27 But see the discussion around ((39) for the weaker criterion for cases containing strong
modals.
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(39) a. The cellular companies are required by law to send a message following
or just prior to use of 75%, 90% and 100% of the package deal
(Originally Hebrew, Ynet).
b. ~B: That’s not true. They must notify customers just prior to use of 75%,
90% and 100% of the package deal.
Now, we have opted for the term Free Alternative rather than the conventional
free choice for a reason. In addition to classical free choice constructions, we
classify as Free Alternative constructions not normally analyzed as free choice.
(30d), here repeated, is such a case:
(40) ALICE: You know if you … put a situation like that to ~Tim or ~Mandy,
([4 LINES OMITTED])
… They … hem and haw around,
(SBC: 007).
Note that the interpretations of or in (37) (a classical free choice case) and
(40) (a classical inclusive case) are quite similar. Both are conjunctive (as
defined above), and both involve a speaker’s impartiality stance towards the
realization of the alternatives she enumerates. What is special about Free
Alternative readings, we propose, is that (a) the alternatives must be inter-
preted as nonfactual (b) the speaker commits to the possible realization of
each of the alternatives, but (c) she only expects one of the alternatives (any
one of them) to actually be realized, and (d) she profiles an impartiality
towards the different alternatives.
The faithful paraphrase we propose for Free alternative cases is ‘any one of
X and Y’. Indeed, (41) show that this paraphrase passes the That is (to say)
explicature test (for (37) and (40) respectively):
(41) a. Randy said that you can wrap em around to one-thirty or one-sixty,
that is (to say) to any one of one-thirty and one-sixty.
b. Alice said that if you put a situation like that to Tim or Mandy,
that is (to say) to any oneof Tim and Mandy, they hem and haw
around.
And (42) show that this interpretation is not a second-tier implicature:
(42) a. ?? Randy literally said that you can wrap em around to one-thirty or
one-sixty or both one-thirty and one-sixty, but actually, he indirectly
conveyed that you can wrap them around to any one of one-thirty and
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one-sixty.
b. ?? Alice literally said that if you put a situation like that possibly to Tim,
possibly to Mandy, possibly to both Tim and Mandy, they hem and haw
around,but actually, she indirectly conveyed that if you put a situation
like that to any one of Tim and Mandy, they hem and haw around.
The ‘any one of X and Y’ is then an explicated reading in Free alternative cases.
To sum up, using a Free Alternative or construction:
(43) a. The speaker puts on the table multiple nonfactual alternatives.
b. The speaker commits to the possibility of each of the alternatives to be
realized.
c. The speaker expects only one alternative to actually be realized.
d. The speaker is impartial as to which alternative is realized (‘any one’).
5 Would-be exclusive ors
Mutual incompatibility between the profiled alternatives is the hallmark of
exclusive or constructions. However, one of the clearest findings from our data
is that or constructions which manifest mutual incompatibility between the
explicit alternatives (thereby licensing an “exclusive” inference) do not actually
serve a single semantic or pragmatic function which would justify classifying
them together under a single reading. More importantly, we claim that exclusiv-
ity per se is not here explicated. We discuss two or readings which would be
considered exclusive under the traditional analysis, because they necessarily
manifest mutual incompatibility between the alternatives: narrowed or (5.1) and
choice or (5.2). But we prefer to analyze them as explicating ‘one out of the
explicit alternatives’ readings. Since the speaker here does commit to one of the
alternatives being the case a maybe substitution should weaken the reading into
a raised options case.
5.1 Narrowed or: ‘One of X and Y’
Examples such as (44) are very popular in the literature on or, because they
supposedly represent the “standard” or construction, where the speaker would
have liked to, but cannot zero in on a single alternative (Grice 1989):
(44) ~Wilma is dating Albinoni or Boccherini (Geurts 2010: 59).
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While analyses vary in detail, researchers are in agreement that in interpreting
(44) the addressee must enrich the linguistic “inclusive” meaning into an
“exclusive” derived meaning via a scalar ‘not both X and Y’ added assumption.
The first point we wish to make about such or constructions, which we term
“narrowed” or constructions, is that contrary to expectations, they are not at all
common. In fact, there were only 5 such examples in the Santa Barbara Corpus
(0.5%). Here are two such examples:
(45) a. ALINA: Right next door is !Ted !Rich,
who’s uh= ,
.. (H) one of the biggies at MTM,
.. (TSK) or,
Lorimar or MGM,
.. oh I forgot which one. (SBC: 006).
b. When people come to SAC, Jan or another P A will be there to explain the
system (LSAC).
Of course, a rare reading is a reading all the same. We propose that the
explicature associated with a narrowed X or Y construction is ‘one of X and Y’,
which is therefore the linguistic formula we use in testing for the reading in the
‘That is (to say)’ test (see (48) below).
Note that unlike raised options cases, the speaker here does commit to one of
the alternatives being the case, so adding maybes removes the speaker’s commit-
ment to ‘at least one of X and Y’, thus turning the example into a raised options one:
(46) ~Right next door is Ted Rich who’s one of the biggies at maybe MTM,
maybe Lorimar, (or) maybe MGM.
The alternatives in narrowed or constructions are strikingly similar to each other.
While referentially distinct, the alternatives in narrowed constructions belong to a
rather tight set, and are similar enough to each other for the differences between
them to most likely not carry any contextual implications in the current discourse.
Note the continuation of (45a) above, where the speakers themselves paraphrase
the disjunction between MTM, Lorimar and MGM with “one of them”/”one of
those places”, Alina also confirming the lack of significance assigned to the
difference between the set members with her final utterance28:
28 As can be seen from the interlocutors’ laughter (the @ symbols), the Narrowed use turns out
to be playful here, precisely because it indicates that the difference between these very
distinguished Hollywood studios doesn’t matter.
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(47) LENORE: @@@[@@]
ALINA: [@]@[2@
LENORE: [2One of them2].
ALINA: (H)2] One of those places.
(H) It all means the same to me.
(SBC: 006).
While the speakers no doubt take it for granted that only one alternative can
reasonably be the case here, they don’t name it, because they are not sure
(45a), or it is their intention to actually leave the (restricted) options open
(45b).
We note that, out of the 172 occurrences of one of X in SBC, not even one
lists individuals in the X slot. What we found were examples such as one of ‘em,
one of his shows. While expressions such as one of John and Mary seem perfectly
grammatical, they are at the very least quite rare. It’s then possible that the
relevant set for one of Xs is usually not individuated, just because X or Y is
available for reference to a non-identified alternative (‘one of’) out of a restricted
set of individuated alternatives. In other words, we’re proposing that one of Xs is
reserved for expressing ‘a non-identified alternative out of a non-individuated
set of entities’, whereas narrowed X or Y is reserved for ‘a non-identified alter-
native out of an individuated set of entities’.
Now, if narrowed or cases receive a ‘one of a restricted set’ reading, how is
this different from the exclusive reading? Let’s apply the explicature diagnostic
test to the reading we’re proposing, ‘one of X and Y’ (48a), and to the exclusive
reading ‘possibly X, ‘possibly Y, but not X and Y’ (48b). (48c) shows that the
narrowed reading is not a special, second-tier use:
(48) a. Alina said that right next door is Ted Rich, who’s one of the biggies at
MTM or Lorimar or MGM, that is (to say) one of MTM, Lorimar and
MGM.
b. ?? Alina said that right next door is Ted Rich, who’s one of the biggies
at MTM or Lorimar or MGM, that is (to say) possibly at MTM, possibly
at Lorimar, possibly at MGM, but not at all three.
c. ??Alina literally said that right next door is Ted Rich, who’s one of the
biggies at MTM or Lorimar or MGM, but actually she indirectly con-
veyed that he is at one of MTM, Lorimar and MGM.
The reason why (48b) is not as faithful as (48a), although the two are truth-
conditionally identical (but see below), is that (48b) attributes to Alina an
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intention to convey that ‘not all the alternatives’ are true of Ted Rich. We
maintain that this is not a speaker-intended message. Because we see the
speaker’s direct interactional goal here as specifying that the referent is one of
a narrowed set of options (where the speaker cannot zero in on a single one) we
do not find the characterization as exclusive as relevant here (see also Section 7).
The ‘That is (to say)’ test supports our position.
Note that (45a) contains three alternatives. Constructions containing more
than two disjuncts run into a problem long noted under a ‘not all alterna-
tives’ Exclusive analysis: The ‘not all alternatives’ route to “exclusivity” does
not eliminate the possibility that the speaker is allowing for more than one,
albeit not all of the alternatives, to be the case (e.g., ‘MTM and Lorimar, to
the exclusion of MGM’ for (45a)). Our account does not run into this
problem.29
In sum, we include under narrowed or constructions cases where:
(49) a. The speaker puts on the table multiple alternatives she entertains.
b. Since the speaker is not in a position to zero in on a single option, her
goal is to narrow the referent to one of a tight set of similar
alternatives.
c. The speaker undertakes a commitment to an unidentified alternative
(‘one of’) out ofthe (individuated) set of alternatives she articulates.
d. The explicit alternatives exhaust the set of possibilities.
5.2 Choice or: ‘Unresolved choice between X and Y’
Choice or constructions (120, 11.4%) profile an unresolved choice between the
alternatives introduced. The syntactic/semantic frame they occur in determines
the status of this unresolved choice. Consider:
(50) a. PHIL: I don’t know if she put it together,
or if !Nancy put it together.
(SBC: 010).
29 Standard theories must incorporate a ‘both alternatives exclusion’ assumption, because the
linguistic meaning they assume does not rule out a ‘both’ option. We, on the other hand, assume
that the core linguistic meaning of or is silent (underspecified) about how many alternatives the
speaker commits to (Alonso-Ovalle 2006).We further claim that the actual number explicated by the
speaker (0, 1, all) is a function of the nature of the alternativity relation construed between the
disjuncts (Ariel and Mauri in prep. b).
Why use or? 973
b. PHIL: we need to find out .. what it is we’re doing.
BRAD: .. [Yeah].
PHIL: Whe[ther] we’re doing .. something right or not.
(SBC: 002).
c. ROY: Shall I do something civilized, ((1 LINE OMITTED))
like clear the table, ((1 LINE OMITTED))
or are we just gonna barbarian it out.
(SBC: 003)
We found three frameworks for choice constructions. Phil’s subordinate question
in (50a) simply asserts that choice (between ‘she’ and ‘Nancy’) is currently not
resolved. Phil’s subordinate question in (50b) asserts the need to resolve a
choice (between ‘right’ or ‘not right’) at some later point. Not surprisingly, the
most frequent frame for choice constructions (88/120, 73.3%) is a direct question
as in (50c), where Roy is eliciting an addressee’s immediate resolution of a
choice (between two courses of action). The latter constructions typically
(but not invariably) carry a distinct prosody.
The reading(s) associated with choice X or Y constructions must be phrased
as higher-level explicatures, because reference must be made to the speaker’s
intended illocutionary force. For the most frequent case, this would be ‘the
speaker asked the addressee to choose between X and Y’. This is therefore the
linguistic formula we use in testing for the reading in the ‘That is (to say)’ test
(see (54a) below).
Note that despite the question framing, we are able to distinguish between
choice and raised options constructions, because, as we’ve already seen in (9),
adding maybes changes choice questions into raised options questions. Using a
choice question, the speaker does expect that one of the alternatives holds,
which is why (50c) is not identical to (51):
(51) ~Shall I clear the table maybe, (or) are we just gonna barbarian it out
maybe?
Like narrowed constructions, choice or constructions too offer a
restricted set of alternatives. But, unlike narrowed cases, the set of options
here is not necessarily as tight a set of similar alternatives. In fact, the
difference between the alternatives is highlighted, because it carries con-
textual implications (Ariel 2015). This is why the choice variant (B2) consti-
tutes a different response from the original, narrowed response (here
abbreviated as B1):
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(52) ~ A: Where was Marc?
B1: Steph’s baseball or volleyball game (Adapted from an LSAC
example).
B2: I’m not sure if it was Steph’s baseball or volleyball game.
While in both cases the speaker commits to one of two options that s/he’s not
sure about, B1 construes this partial response as sufficient for the discourse
purposes (“narrowed”). B2, on the other hand, construes the same information
as an unresolved issue (“choice”).
Consider the following example, which seems to support the classical
exclusive analysis, since M.T equates between or and ‘not both’:
(53) Mom: Did you eat the orange cake?
Or the chocolate cake.
M.T: Why or?
Both.
Nonetheless, applying the explicature ‘That is (to say)’ test to (53) shows that
‘choice’ is part of the intended meaning (54a), although ruling out ‘both’ is not
(54b). (54c) shows that ‘choice’ is not a special, second-tier implicature:
(54) a. Mom asked M.T whether she ate the orange cake or the chocolate cake,
that is (to say) she asked M.T to choose between alternative answers:
the orange cake and the chocolate cake.
b. ?? Mom asked M.T whether she ate the orange cake or the chocolate
cake, that is (to say) she asked whether M.T ate possibly the orange
cake, possibly the chocolate cake, but not both cakes.
c. ??Mom literally asked M.T whether she ate possibly the orange cake,
possibly thechocolate cake, possibly both, but actually, she indirectly
asked that M.T choose between alternative answers: the orange cake
and the chocolate cake.
The tests show that the unresolved choice interpretation is not arrived at by
ruling out ‘both/all alternatives’. We maintain that the choice reading is directly
responsible for the ‘one of’ aspect. ‘Not both’, on our analysis falls out of the
choice involved, which calls for excluding all but one of the alternatives on the
table.
Choice or constructions are restricted to (in)direct questions. We could
perhaps then propose that choice is reducible to narrow + Question. However,
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in addition to the different relation between the alternatives in the two cases
(similarity focus for narrowed, difference focus for choice), we argue that there is
an inherent connection specifically between choice and questions. Indeed,
typological claims recently offered by Mauri (2008a, 2008b; Mauri and van der
Auwera 2012) show that it’s not just the case that no language has a dedicated
“exclusive” or, but also that some languages have a dedicated connective which
may be used solely for the reading here identified as choice (e.g., Polish czy,
Finnish vai, and Georgian tu). These connectives occur in interrogative sen-
tences, and cannot be used when the speaker’s purpose is simply to present a
set of alternatives, even if she knows full well that at most one of the alternatives
is the case. This is exemplified in (55), where the specialized disjunctive con-
nective tu must be used when the speaker’s aim is to elicit an immediate choice
(as in (55a)), but the nonspecialized an must be used when the addressee needs
to simply confirm (or deny) a proposed set of possibilities (as in (55b)). Needless
to say, both examples are equally “exclusive” cases within questions:
(55) Georgian, Kartvelian
a. Xval sk’olaši c’avidet tu saxlši davrčet?
Tomorrow school:LOC go:1pl:OPT C-or home:LOC stay:1pl:OPT
‘Tomorrow are we going to school or are we staying home?’
b. Ginda gaviseirnot ertad, an čai davliot, an k’inos
want:2sg walk:1pl together S-or tea drink:1pl S-or movie
vuq’urot, an … rac ginda?
watch:1pl S-or what want:2sg
‘Would you go for a walk with me, or have a cup of tea, or watch a
movie, or … whatever?’ (Possible answer: YES/NO)
(Mauri 2008a: 71 Abbreviations: C=choice; LOC=locative; OPT=optative;
pl=plural; S=simple; sg=singular.)
There are two noteworthy points about (55b). First, the use of the specialized
‘choice’ or is not syntactically conditioned (by the presence of an interrogative)
or it would have been used here as well. Second, while a choice between the
explicit alternatives (as well as others not listed) may be inferred in (55b), choice
is not the explicature of the construction. It is then the explicated ‘choice’
reading that governs the use of the dedicated ‘choice’ or expression.
Based on our analysis, we therefore characterize as choice or constructions
cases where:
(56) a. The speaker puts on the table multiple alternatives.
b. The explicit alternatives carry different contextual implications.
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c. The speaker’s aim is to profile some unresolved choice of a single
alternative fromamong the enumerated alternatives, in order to assert
this nonresolution, or assert the need to resolve it, or request a choice
right there and then.
6 Would-be either exclusive or
inclusive – Exhaustive or: ‘Only X and Y ’
The last reading we propose is “exhaustive”, which asserts that the explicit
alternatives are the only alternatives on the table. Surprisingly perhaps, exhaus-
tive cases include cases that would be classified either as exclusive or as
inclusive under the traditional analysis. While mostly profiling alternatives
incompatible with each other, the speaker committing to only one alternative
being the case (“exclusive” in (57c)), some exhaustive cases show a speaker’s
commitment to both alternatives (conjunctive in (57a) and (57b))30:
(57) a. JULIE:.. It’s a it’s sport for either the brave or the stupid.
(SBC: 056).
b. Your phone is EITHER busy,
OR on voice message
(Originally Hebrew phone message, 22 May 2008).
c. FRANK:But apparently it was either a heart attack or an aneurysm,
(SBC: 019)
Julie’s point in (a) is that only two types of people (brave ones and stupid ones),
would dare engage in this sport. Now, brave people and stupid people are
markedly distinct from each other. Still, one goal of a speaker using an exhaus-
tive or construction is that the real enough difference between the alternatives
does not carry discourse significance. The speaker focuses on restricting the
options to those specified explicitly, in order to thereby rule out other alterna-
tives not explicitly specified (say, smart, adventurous, or athletic people in
(57a)). The speaker’s goal in exhaustive cases is to show how restricted the
number of alternatives is.31 This is even clearer in (b), where the person leaving
the message has repeatedly tried to speak with the addressee, but always failed
30 We here leave it to the reader to verify that adding maybes to the exhaustive cases below
removes the speaker’s commitment, in effect changing the reading to that of raised options.
31 Indeed, no exhaustive or construction introduces more than 2 disjuncts in SBC, whereas
6.4% of the rest of the constructions introduce 3 or more disjuncts.
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to achieve this desired (implicit) alternative. Crucially, while ‘a busy phone’ and
‘a voice message setting on the phone’ constitute two distinct states of affairs,
the speaker’s point is that in the specific context they amount to the same thing
(‘I can’t talk to you’).
Note that whereas (57a) and (57b) are conjunctive (the speaker committing to
both stupid and brave people… and to the phone being both busy and on phone
message – on different occasions), (57c) is not. The reason why we classified these
examples together is that the speaker’s main point in all of them is that ‘the explicit
X and Y alternatives are the only ones relevant or worthy of discussion, to the
exclusion of any others’. The explicature associated with an exhaustive X or Y
construction is ‘the only alternatives are X and Y’, which is therefore the linguistic
formula we use in testing for the reading in the ‘That is (to say)’ test. Indeed, when
we apply the explicature ‘That is (to say)’ test to these examples, they share the
same faithful paraphrase which limits the alternatives to the ones explicitly men-
tioned, at the same time also ruling out other options left implicit.
Consider the application of the ‘That is (to say)’ test to (57a) and (57c). (58a)
and (59a) show that the reading we propose passes the test, but neither the
“inclusive” (58b) nor the “exclusive” (59b) interpretations do. The test applied in
(58c) and (59c) shows that the reading is not a special, second-tier implicature:
(58) a. Julie said that it’s sport for either the brave or the stupid, that is (to say)
that the only alternatives are that it’s a sport for the brave and for the
stupid (other options ruled out).
b. ??Julie said that it’s sport for either the brave or the stupid, that is (to
say) that it’s possibly a sport for the brave, possibly a sport for the
stupid, and possibly for both the brave and the stupid.
c. ?? Julie literally said that it’s sport for either the brave or the stupid, but
actually she indirectly conveyed that that the only alternatives are that
it’s a sport for the brave and the stupid (other options ruled out).
(59) a. Frank said that apparently it was either a heart attack or an aneurysm,
that is (to say) that the only alternatives are a heart attack and an
aneurysm (other options ruled out).
b. ?? Frank said that apparently it was either a heart attack or an aneur-
ysm, that is (to say) that it was possibly a heart attack, possibly an
aneurysm but not both a heart attack and an aneurysm.
c. ?? Frank literally said that apparently it was either a heart attack or an
aneurysm, butactually he indirectly conveyed that the only alterna-
tives are a heart attack andan aneurysm (other options ruled out).
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While (58b) and (59b) are quite likely compatible with what the speakers
believe, they do not constitute faithful explications of the speakers’ intended
messages (see Section 7.2 about Truth Compatible Inferences).
There were only 38 exhaustive cases in SBC (3.7%). As predicted by
Zimmermann (2000), many of these or constructions (19, 50%) are expressed
with the specialized either… or… construction.32 Now, as we saw in Section 5.2,
choice constructions are exhaustive too. However, while choice ors assume that
the explicit disjuncts present an exhaustive list of alternatives, they prominently
profile a discourse-relevant difference between these alternatives, to the point
that a choice between them is invoked. We classified or examples as exhaustive
or constructions if the speaker’s main point is that the alternatives presented are
profiled as exhausting all options, so that other, implicit options are ruled out as
part of the message. In addition, while the objective difference between the
alternatives here is not at all suppressed, this difference is denied discourse
relevance (certainly, no choice is involved).33 Note that the fact that the alter-
natives may at the same time be mutually (in)compatible is actually discoursally
irrelevant for exhaustive cases. It is the absence of alternatives other than the
ones specified that is essential to the speaker’s point.
Now, a silent “exhaustification” procedure has recently been proposed for
scalar “implicatures” in general, and for disjunctions in particular, as a way to
derive the classical Exclusivity, i.e., ‘not both X and Y’ interpretation (Chierchia
2013, inter alia). The explicature tests above showed that this is not the right way
to explain narrowed and choice constructions, because ‘not both’ is not speaker-
intended (even if compatible with her beliefs). Exhaustive readings do, however,
involve exhaustification, with ‘only’ taking as focus ‘X’ and ‘Y’ each on its own.
But the alternative(s) routinely ruled out are actually not ‘both X and Y’, as is
commonly assumed. To see that these implicit alternatives (‘available to talk’ in
(60)) are the ones to be ruled out, rather than an ‘X and Y’ alternative, consider
the following two constructed responses to (57b), here repeated:
(60) A: Your phone is EITHER busy OR on voice message.
~B1: Yeah, I’m not available on the phone/you can’t get through to me.
~B2: ??Yeah, both of these things are true.
~B3: Yeah, you’re right.
32 But contra Zimmerman, not all either… or… cases were so interpreted.
33 While Geurts (2005: 396) includes an exhaustivity interpretation whenever the utterance
ends with a falling intonation contour, he admits that exhaustivity may hold to different
degrees. We find that such differences affect the reading.
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B1 shows a felicitous confirmation of the rejection of the implicit desir-
able alternative, namely, ‘talking with B on the phone’. Now, both B2 and B3
confirm the conjunctive interpretation for A, but B2 is not as natural.
Indeed, the distinction between the two alternatives is not an issue
here, so referring to each of them separately is not felicitous. Next, con-
firming the truth of ‘not both’ for nonconjunctive exhaustives is not felici-
tous either:
(61) FRANK: But apparently it was either a heart attack or an aneurysm.
~RON1: Yeah, they ruled out all other causes.
~RON2: ?? Yeah, they ruled out the possibility that it was both.
What Ron can agree with must have been conveyed by Frank. This is why Ron1
is coherent. What Ron cannot coherently agree with must have not been con-
veyed by Frank (it’s only a Truth Compatible Inference, see 7.2 below). This is
why Ron2 is less coherent.
Next, while both choice and exhaustive readings may involve a so-called
exclusivity interpretation (‘one of the alternatives’ for us), for the choice cases it
is the contrastive relation between the explicit alternatives themselves that is
highlighted (an internal contrast, involving a choice between the two). For the
exhaustive cases what’s focused on instead is a contrastive relation between the
explicit alternatives, taken together, and any other alternatives (not explicitly
mentioned) that could be entertained (an external contrast, leading to the
rejection of the implicit alternatives).34 Indeed, just like the choice cases are at
the same time taken to be exhaustive, so the majority of the exhaustive cases are
in addition typically, but not necessarily, understood to introduce mutually
incompatible alternatives, as in:
(62) FOSTER: ... Human nature,
.. does not .. possess .. free will.
(H) It is like a horse.
(H) Ridden by God or the Devil.
… The rider possesses the will.
… The horse .. obeys.
(SBC: 025)
34 But of course, one of these inexplicit deniable options can be ‘both X and Y’, as we see in
Section 7.1 below.
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This mutual incompatibility is not part of the speaker’s intended meaning
for exhaustive or constructions, however.35 Rather, it is a TCI (Truth-compatible
inference), potentially derived based on our world knowledge about which
states of affairs are mutually incompatible (the majority), which are most likely
mutually incompatible, and which are actually compatible with each other
(a minority). For example, unlike the mutually incompatible alternatives in
(62), ‘being brave’ and ‘being stupid’ in (57a) are quite compatible with each
other: One can certainly be both brave and stupid. But the applicability of Julie’s
utterance re ‘brave or stupid’ to people who are simultaneously brave and stupid
is, we submit, merely a TCI. In (57c) the two alternatives are not necessarily
mutually incompatible, but quite plausibly so. In (62), the preacher’s immediate
goal is to assert that human beings are controlled by some higher power and to
rule out the alternative that human nature possesses free will. The difference
between being controlled by God versus being controlled by the devil is not in
fact at issue here.
Consider now the following example, which nicely shows the difference
between a choice or construction, where choice resolution is highly relevant
(the first disjunction), and an exhaustive or construction, where deciding
between the options is not at issue, although ruling other options is (the second
disjunction):
(63) The speaker said that the Israeli ambassador to Congo demanded from his
hosts to inquire if it was an accident or an assassination, and the Congo
police made inquiries on the matter till they reached the conclusion that it
was an accident or an assassination
(Originally Hebrew, Assaf Inbari, Habaita, 2009: 221).36
As shown by the application of the explicature ‘That is (to say)’ test, all the
police could do was narrow down the nature of the event to only two alter-
natives, the achievement being that they ruled out other options (e.g., natural
death). To be sure, there is a TCI to mutual incompatibility between the alter-
natives here, but that is not a speaker-intended message:
(64) The Israeli ambassador to Congo demanded from his hosts to inquire if it
was an accident or an assassination, that is (to say) he demanded that they
35 We’re here in agreement with Zimmermann (2000), who clearly distinguishes between
exhaustivity and exclusiveness, even if the way we draw the semantics/pragmatics division of
labor is different from his.
36 We owe this interesting example to Israela Becker.
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resolve the choice between the two alternatives, and the Congo police made
inquiries on the matter till they reached the conclusion that it was an
accident or an assassination, that is (to say) that the only alternatives are
accident and assassination (other options ruled out).
Based on our analysis, we characterize as exhaustive or constructions cases
where:
(65) a. The speaker puts on the table multiple alternatives, but ones heavily
restricted in number.
b. While referentially quite distinct from each other, the explicit alterna-
tives are notasserted in order to support different contextual
implications.
c. The speaker’s aim is to assert that the set of possible options is limited
to the set of explicitly mentioned alternatives (other options ruled out).
d. Which implicit alternative(s) are ruled out (by implicature) is contex-
tually determined.
7 Where have all the exclusive and inclusive
interpretations gone?
If our analyses above are correct, then natural languages do not have much use
for explicating inclusivity and exclusivity (as currently defined). Could these
inferences then be Generalized or Particularized Conversational Implicatures
(GCIs/PCIs), in which case, while indirect, they still fall under the speaker’s
communicative intention? 7.1 shows that or constructions are sometimes asso-
ciated with certain PCIs on top of their explicatures. But 7.2 argues that exclusive
and inclusive assumptions are routinely not among these implicatures. There is
no need for privileged ‘possibly both’ or ‘not both’ nor for a grammaticized ‘not
both’. ‘Not/possibly both’ are TCIs or background assumptions. We exemplify
our point with respect to ‘not both’.
7.1 Particularized conversational implicatures
Speakers definitely use or constructions to further generate PCIs sometimes.
We here chose to exemplify two cases of PCIs accompanying exhaustive
constructions.
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Recall that exhaustive constructions receive an ‘only X and Y (other options
ruled out)’ explicature. While this much is explicated, the rejection of the
specific alternative is a PCI, albeit a very strong PCI sometimes. Consider (57c)
again, here repeated as (66a). Note that the paraphrase which specifies the
alternative ruled out passes the ‘Indirectly conveyed’ diagnostic for PCIs (b):
(66) a. FRANK: But apparently it was either a heart attack or an aneurysm.
b. Frank said that apparently a heart attack and an aneurysm were the
only alternatives
(other options ruled out). In addition, he indirectly conveyed that
non-natural causes of death were ruled out.
Next, note that while ‘not both’ is overwhelmingly irrelevant for exhaustive cases
(see again (59b)), here is an example where ‘not both’ is indeed a strong PCI:
(67) a. Bar On: Either security or welfare
(Originally Hebrew, cited by Shelly Chemotic, 15 August 2008).
b. Bar On said that the only alternatives are security and welfare (other
options ruledout). In addition, he indirectly conveyed that the alter-
native of both security and welfare is ruled out.
The Israeli politician’s (67a) was uttered against a background assumption that
the alternative favored by Israelis is ‘both security and welfare’. Given budgetary
constraints, however, the speaker does generate a ‘not both security and wel-
fare’ PCI. But we maintain that the ‘not both’ interpretation here is part of the
speaker’s intended message simply because it happens to be the salient implicit
alternative ruled out by the exhaustive explicature. In other words, ‘not both’ as
a PCI derived from exhaustive constructions is simply a special case of the
general pattern whereby ad hoc implicit alternatives are rejected. It is not the
dedicated ‘not both’ implicature assumed in the literature, based on some
specific Gricean or grammatical process.37
The brief discussion in 7.1 shows that our analysis of or readings in terms of
explicatures does not eliminate the discourse reality of additional PCIs. Now,
we’ve argued against an explicated status for inclusive and exclusive
37 Note that Bar On may also generate a “please choose between welfare and security”
implicature here, but again, this ad hoc implicature must be distinguished from our choice
reading, where choice is directly conveyed (explicated).
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assumptions. In order to show that they don’t fall under the speaker’s commu-
nicative intention we need to show that the exclusive and inclusive interpreta-
tions have not all gone to PCIs either.
7.2 Mutual (in)compatibility, background and truth-compatible
inferences
Interlocutors can no doubt infer (in)compatibility between alternatives, at least
in the majority of or constructions. The crucial question, however, is not whether
they are able to draw such inferences but whether they actually do, and whether
they are licensed to view them as part of the speaker’s communicated message.38
We propose that mutual (in)compatibility inferences are only truth-compatible
inferences or background assumptions for the most part.39
We focus on TCIs, but first, here’s an exemplification of the working of
background assumptions, instrumental in disambiguating the following case:
(68) They always came from Cuba or South America I guess
(LSAC)
For the or construction here to constitute a narrowed reading the speaker
intends the addressee to assume as background that ‘all the bananas came
from one location’, which leads to an incompatibility assumption. For the
separative conjunction reading, the background assumption must be that ‘the
bananas referred to came in alternating batches, from different places’, which
leads to a compatibility assumption. Needless to say, neither assumption is
speaker-communicated (the reader is invited to verify that the assumptions fail
any of the diagnostic tests above).
Moving on to TCIs, recall that we classify or constructions as ‘raised options’
when the speaker does not commit to even one of the alternatives being true. We
classify other constructions as HLCs, because the speaker’s point is not so much the
explicit members she presents, but rather, the higher-level category constructed
38 For grammaticized theories such as Chierchia (2004) and onwards the question would be
whether such assumptions should be generated by the grammar.
39 We should emphasize, however, that we are not rejecting these inferences on the basis of
some “economy” principle, namely, since these (in)compatibility inferences may be “freely”
derived from general knowledge and/or the specific context anyway, we don’t need to include
them in our analysis. Freely available assumptions may well be linguistically encoded or
intended to be pragmatically derived, as they indeed are in choice or constructions.
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based on these members. But what about the assumptions concerning mutual
compatibility or incompatibility of the explicitly mentioned alternatives? We pro-
pose that even when such inferences can be made, the mutual (in)compatibility
question is simply not an issue when these readings are expressed.40 They are TCIs,
i.e., assumptions possibly subscribed to by the speaker given her utterance, but
crucially, not part of the speaker-intended message.
Let’s consider the raised options examples in 3.1 first. Most of these intro-
duce mutually incompatible alternatives (11, 12, 13). For example, the addressee
in (12) couldn’t possibly be there (awake) and be sleeping at the same time. But
other cases introduce alternatives which are compatible with each other. A
similar picture emerges when we examine the HLCs in 3.2. (17), and (18) present
compatible alternatives, and (16) and (21) present incompatible alternatives. For
example, low HIV percentages may very well be true of both rural areas and
central Iowa (17). On the other hand, ‘king’ and ‘queen’ (16) are incompatible
with each other.
To see that (in)compatibility inferences are irrelevant to the speaker’s goal we
can look at how they fare on the PCI ‘Indirectly Conveyed’ test applied to (21):
(69) ?? Montoyo said that if he is the president of a major labor union or a major
corporation, the position as president of that entity gives him so much power.
And in addition, he indirectly conveyed that he cannot be the president of
both a major labor union and a major corporation.
While (21) is compatible with a ‘not both’ inference, the failed paraphrase in (69)
shows that ‘not both’ does not fall under the speaker’s communicative intention.
(70) makes the same point for an “inclusivity” TCI for (3):
(70) ?? Gilbert said that she got sick and tired of turning on the news and seeing
another corrupt man or another scandal breaking out, and in addition he
indirectly conveyed that she possibly got tired of both another corrupt
man and another scandal breaking out.
And here’s a raised options case (11), where despite the fact that the individual
alternatives are prominently profiled, the exclusive assumption is not implicated:
40 Our position is then different from Zimmermann’s (2000) (and other philosophers) although
they too view ‘exclusive’ interpretations as only pragmatically derived, based on the incompat-
ibility between the alternatives. We distinguish between speaker-intended and speaker-non-
intended exclusive inferences, even if both are pragmatic.
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(71) ??S said that part of the shares were transferred to the children or they were
returned, and in addition he indirectly conveyed that the shares were not
both transferred to the children and returned…
S did not intend to convey the incompatibility assumption in (71), although it is
most likely true, given his utterance and the way of the world.
Here’s the test applied to an exhaustive or construction ((57a), with an
inclusive inference):
(72) ??Julie said that it’s a sport for either the brave or the stupid, and in
addition she indirectly conveyed that it’s possibly a sport for those who
are both brave and stupid.
Applying the PCI test to the separative conjunction in (30b) (see (73a)), to the
narrowed construction in (46) (see (73b)) and to the choice in (53a) (see (73c))
shows that (in)compatibility inferences do not carry a PCI status for these read-
ings as well:
(73) a. ?? The speaker said that it’s easier to do naked eye or binoculars,and in
addition he indirectly conveyed that both were easier to do.
b. ?? Alina said that right next door is Ted Rich, who’s one of the biggies at
MTM or Lorimar, and in addition she indirectly conveyed that Ted
Rich was not at both MTM and Lorimar.
c. ?? Mom wanted to know if M.T ate the orange cake or the chocolate cake,
and inaddition she indirectly conveyed that M.T did not eat both.
The point is that while (in)compatibility inferences regarding the alternatives
introduced in all six readings may be derived by the addressee, he is not
licensed to incorporate them as speaker-intended messages. Because they are
not relevant for the speaker, they do not fall under her communicative inten-
tions. In other words, the answer to the question of where have all the inclusive/
exclusive inferences gone is that they’ve gone to background and truth-compa-
tible inferences, almost every one of them.
8 Conclusions and future research
Our main conclusion in this paper is that speakers’ or constructions profile an
alternativity relation in order to express many different readings not previously
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recognized. These readings were identified by examining the 1053 SBC or
examples in their natural conversational context, and applying to them rele-
vant diagnostic tests. We characterized each reading in terms of the explicature
it expresses and in terms of the number of alternatives the speaker commits to.
The result of these analyses shows that the two readings which have domi-
nated the literature, namely the inclusive and exclusive readings, as currently
defined, are only marginally relevant for natural interactions. Assumptions
about the (in)compatibility between the explicit alternatives, we argued, are
more often than not merely background or truth-compatible inferences, which
do not constitute part of the speaker’s explicature, nor implicature. In addition,
we reclassified free choice readings as conjunctive readings, either separative
conjunction or free alternative (which, in addition, collects some “inclusive”
cases as well).
Alternativity is what unifies all or constructions (Ariel and Mauri in prep. b).
But speakers mobilize profiled alternatives for different discourse goals/read-
ings. We’ve argued that speakers use or constructions in order to raise alter-
native options for discussion even if they cannot commit to even one of them
(raised options), because they want to refer to a higher-level category (HLC),
because they offer a single predication over alternatives they wish to construe as
independent of each other (conjunctive), because they cannot zero in on a single
alternative, so they only narrow the options to a tight set (narrowed), because
they want to profile an unresolved choice, typically in order to elicit such a
choice (choice) or because they wish to profile some alternatives as the only
alternatives on the table (exhaustive). Table 3 summarizes the six readings we
proposed for or constructions (exclusive of repair and idiomatic cases, which we
are currently analyzing—see the appendix). The table lists the explicatures
associated with each, and the number of alternatives the speaker necessarily
commits to:
Table 3: Or readings and committed alternatives.
Reading Meaning Committed
Alternatives
Raised Options Possibly X, possibly Y 
Higher-Level Category Higher-level category Z, comprising
members such as X and Y

Conjunctive Both/any of X and Y 
Narrowed One of X and Y 
Choice Unresolved choice between X and Y 
Exhaustive Only X and Y, (other options ruled out) /
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The second column shows that all six explicatures differ in their profiled
meanings from “inclusive” and “exclusive” readings, as well as from each other.
As can be seen in the third column, only narrowed, choice and some of the
exhaustives meet the predictions of the classical theory regarding the number of
committed alternatives. Using a conjunctive (and some exhaustives) the speaker
commits to both alternatives, which is a stronger commitment than the predicted
‘possibly both alternatives’. And the speaker does not necessarily commit to
even one of the explicit alternatives under raised options and HLC.
Our claims have both empirical and theoretical implications. First, we sub-
mit that research addressing natural language has to be empirically based in
order to clearly distinguish between what is discourse-relevant and speaker-
intended for interlocutors and what is not. Meshing the utterance meaning with
the objective reality behind it is not a goal in and of itself. Second, we submit
that any lexical analysis proposed for or must be able to derive the readings we
found in the data, and specifically as explicatures (rather than as special,
nonliteral uses). The findings for raised options and HLC readings, where the
speaker does not necessarily commit to even one alternative, cast doubt on the
classical ‘at least one alternative’ semantic analysis (linguistic meanings are
cancelable). In Ariel and Mauri (in prep. b) we support a minimalistic procedural
meaning of an “alternativity” relation between the disjuncts as or’s core mean-
ing, an analysis which is quite compatible with Dik’s (1968) Zimmermann’s
(2000), Mauri (2008b: 155–161) and Alonso-Ovalle’s (2006) nonpropositional
“set of possibilities” core for or.
We expect that this procedural core meaning of alternativity should be
associated with the 6 readings here discussed in a universal way, because
they provide a discourse motivation for the speaker’s choice to list alternatives.
What may vary across languages is how the meaning of alternativity is mapped
onto grammar, i.e., through a general connective, such as English or or through
more specific constructions for specific sub-types of alternativity relations (see
Mauri 2008b: Ch. 5] for a distinction between general versus dedicated or
constructions). It should be interesting to examine what readings are associated
with more specific or constructions, and what additional readings may be
attested for the general or constructions cross-linguistically (see the sub-con-
structions/readings listed in the appendix for English). Furthermore, there may
very well be diachronic relations such that the evolution of some reading
depends on the prior availability of another.
Another important direction for future research concerns the question of
how addressees arrive at the specific reading intended by the speaker. While we
emphasized the role of pragmatics here, we believe that some of the readings are
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at least partly compositional. In addition, specific contexts are biased towards
certain but not other readings. Choice constructions, for example, are restricted
to direct and indirect yes/no questions. This is a necessary condition for this
reading. It is not, however, a sufficient condition, so other readings occur within
(in)direct questions. Only compositionally forces an exhaustive reading, while
either X or Y provides a strong explicit cue for it. Still, not all either all construc-
tions are interpreted as exhaustive, and nonspecialized or constructions may be
exhaustive too. Raised options are often read off of constructions which poten-
tially indicate lack of commitment (questions, non-falling intonation boundary).
They also come in multiple disjuncts more often than other readings. But again,
these are biasing cues at best. separative conjunction readings are very strongly
associated with some downward entailing (DE) contexts (especially negation
and complements of a comparative construction), as well as with contexts
availing a plurality of events (such as generics and habituals). But we certainly
found cases where the presence of such factors did not result in a separative
conjunction reading. Free alternative cases are restricted to nonfactual modals
(such as can), as well as nonfactual DE contexts (conditional antecedents). But
again, these linguistic contexts do not guarantee a Free alternative reading.
Narrowed readings are associated with very tight sets of similar alternatives
which carry similar contextual implications, and higher-level category readings
are more often restricted to a single intonation unit than other readings.
Obviously, for the latter two readings the indications are rather weak.
All in all, different readings vary as to how strongly they are indicated for
formally and/or semantically. And we can’t emphasize enough the role of
pragmatics in zeroing in on the contextually relevant reading. Most of the
contributing factors, although conducive to specific interpretations, do not
encode them. Moreover, implicit semantic cues (such as modality) are only
made available by pragmatic processes. For example, consider:
(74) ERIKA: Where’s your bathroom at?
MAUREEN: Right around the bend. ((1 LINE OMITTED))
Or upstairs.
One or the other.
(SBC: 035).
If we interpret Maureen’s utterance as ‘our bathrooms are right around the bend
or upstairs’ the or construction is a (factual) separative conjunction, which
predicates locations on two separate bathrooms. But if we adopt a modal
interpretation (something like ‘you can use any one of the bathrooms’) then
the reading is Free alternative. We opted for the latter (partly because of the
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following or construction), but a different context might favor a separative
conjunction reading.
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Appendix A: Or readings not here analyzed
Here are typical examples of the readings excluded from this paper, arranged in
descending order of frequency. The main purpose of this appendix is to show that
the classical analysis of or constructions as inclusive or exclusive is not at all
based on the types of examples we too had to exclude due to space limitations.
1. ALINA: We had to go see !Jan last Sunday?




2. CAM: well what do you mean,
he’s gay or something,
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(SBC: 044) (Hedged X)
3. LENORE: He has a .. restaurant or something,
(SBC: 006) (Member of a restricted higher-level category)
4. DANNY: … Our mission is a goal or task which one is destined to
accomplish.
(SBC: 030). (Equivalence)
5. SHARON: there’s a privacy code or whatever,
(SBC: 004) (Provisional X)
6. LINDSEY: (H) .. she didn’t have any sores,
or anything,
(SBC: 018) (X widening)
7. MELISSA: I made some stupid comment,
like why are you voting for them.
(H)or something like that.
(SBC: 019) (X or similar)
8. LYNNE: I mean whether the horse being used a lot or not,
that’s twelve bucks.
(SBC: 001) (Indifference)
9. SHERI: … Is that um,
… full of yucky stuff?
Or what.
(SBC: 058) (‘I can’t imagine’)
10. KEVIN: Well it’s just a .. month or so,
(SBC: 036). (Haloed X)
11. ALINA:… Was that nasty,
or what.
(SBC: 006) (Strengthened X)
12. MONTOYO: Would you say, ((1 LINE OMITTED))
…that your parents were very much influenced by the Vietnam
war?
… One way or the other?
(SBC: 012) (Some/any)
Why use or? 993
